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ABSTRACT
Investors, employees, and societies are interested in human capital information. This information will assist investors to 
assess the effectiveness of human capital management to deliberate their investment capital allocation. The employees 
will also know the extent of their development and value in organizations. Despite the significant role of human capital 
in the success and survival of an organization, human capital information disclosure is still limited in annual reports. 
Thus, investors or other stakeholders have scarce information to distinguish between organizations that develop human 
capital and those that constrain human capital. The factors that explain the disclosure is still unknown. In light of 
stakeholder’s theory, this study investigated the relationship between highly unionized companies and government-owned 
companies, which are factors that can pressure companies to disclose human capital information in annual reports. 
Companies from the banking and financial institution industries were selected as highly unionized companies, whereas 
companies from the real property industry were selected as poorly unionized companies based on the Malaysian Trade 
Union Congress (MTUC) dataset. Government ownership was also identified in these sample companies. A total of 192 
annual reports gathered from 48 companies for the financial year from 2010 to 2014 were analyzed in terms of content. 
Control variables, such as age, size, profit, and leverage, were also associated in the relationship. This study determined 
that highly unionized companies (banks) and government ownership demonstrate significantly positive relationship 
with human capital information reporting in annual reports. For control variables, only the size of companies shows 
positive relationship with the disclosure. Therefore, the presence of stakeholders in companies (i.e., union membership 
and government) is considered a good predictor for reporting human capital information in annual reports.
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INTRODUCTION
Human capital disclosure (HCD) is scarce in annual 
reports. Thus, investors or other stakeholders have limited 
information to distinguish between firms that develop 
human capital through recognition of workforce and 
those that do not. This issue has long been a challenge 
for the relevance of traditional corporate disclosure 
practices (Campbell & Rahman 2010). The absence of 
HCD results in the uncertainty of real economic value, 
particularly for services and technology companies that 
heavily hinge on human intelligence. Thus, investing in 
these companies is substantially risky (Marr, Mouritsen 
& Bukh 2003; Orens, Aerts & Lybaert 2009). Although 
no mandatory requirement is necessary to disclose human 
capital information, numerous companies around the 
globe voluntarily report such information, particularly 
through their corporate annual reports.
 Evidence of HCD practice in annual reports can be 
mainly found in intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) 
studies. Previous ICD studies consistently showed that 
HCD in annual reports was predominantly disclosed after 
relational capital disclosure (RCD) (e.g., Guthrie & Petty 
2000; Brennan 2001; Bozzolan, O’ Regan & Ricceri 2006; 
Campbell & Rahman 2010; Abhayawansa & Azim 2014). 
However, several other recent studies (e.g., Wagiciengo & 
Belal 2012; Bellora & Guenther 2013; De Silva, Stratford 
& Clark 2014). The results of these studies may reflect 
the expanding interest on reporting human capital over 
relational and structural capital information. 
 The lacuna in previous studies was considered in 
the effect of stakeholders on HCD. Stakeholder theory 
believes that the motivation for companies to practice 
HCD may partially hinge on pressure from labor unions 
and government presence. The presence of labor 
unions and government interest in companies may 
pressure the management to disclose human capital 
information. Against this background, this study tested 
the relationship between highly unionized companies 
(i.e., banking) and government ownership over HCD in 
192 annual reports of 48 companies. The findings of 
this research are congruent with the expectation that 
unionized companies and government ownership are good 
predictors of HCD in annual reports. The contributions of 
this study are twofold. The findings add new relevance 
to stakeholder theory in understanding the role of labor 
unions on corporate reporting behavior. The results of 
this study also provide an incentive for all companies 
to focus on HCD because disclosure would likely foster 
a harmonious relationship with employees and maintain 
“good government image.” 
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HCD
HCD has no definitive concept; to date, no stand-alone HCD 
that is systematically compiled by companies has been 
established. Instead, HCD is only made voluntarily and can 
be found interspersed throughout annual reports. As long 
as the information disclosed in annual reports pertains to 
human capital, such information can be classified as HCD. 
In general terms, the intent of such disclosure is to provide 
relevant information for related users to satisfy the need 
that enhances decision-making and accountability (Guthrie 
& Petty 2000; Verrecchia 2001). In particular, HCD is the 
information on the knowledge, capabilities, and motivation 
of the workforce that a company discloses. 
 The community, employees, and shareholders expect 
companies to manage and utilize human resources for 
competitive advantage and public approval. These 
stakeholders expect companies to disclose information 
relating to the management of human resources in their 
annual reports to grant approval about the activities of the 
companies (Subbarao & Zeghal 1997). The frequency, 
content, and extent of disclosure found in annual reports 
are considered to be associated with the importance 
that companies place on human resources (Vuontisjarvi 
2006). In general, HCD can be derived from the annual 
reports in various methods and aspects, and often in 
sections that pertain to a company’s human resource, 
including individual capabilities, competencies, talents, 
communications, knowledge and experience of staff and 
managers, welfare, and health and safety (Ja’fari, Rezaei 
Nour & Hosnavei 2006).
 HCD is important because it signals the legitimacy 
of a company toward society, as well as provides a clear 
image of a company’s vision and mission with regard 
to human capital. Subbarao and Zeghal (1997) argued 
that investors, employees, and societies are interested 
in human capital information. They contended that this 
information assists investors assess the effectiveness of 
human capital management, thereby resulting in prudent 
investment decisions. Moreover, HCD enables employees to 
be apprised of the extent to which human capital is valued 
in the companies that employ them.
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON HCD
Previous studies have demonstrated the practice of HCD 
encapsulated within ICD (Guthrie & Petty 2000; Yi & 
Davey 2010; Campbell & Rahman 2010). The first study 
in this stream was conducted by Guthrie and Petty (2000) 
in Australia. This study has been extensively cited and 
has paved the way for other studies worldwide. Their 
study investigated ICD in the 1998 annual reports of 20 
Australian companies. The findings suggested that human 
capital was the second most popular information disclosed 
(after relational capital) and accounted for 30% of the total 
ICD. Many subsequent studies followed the similar genre 
of Guthrie and Petty (2000), in which the content analysis 
technique is used to analyze the content of human capital 
information. The majority of these studies (e.g., Bozzolan, 
Favotto & Ricceri 2003 in Italy; Abeysekera & Guthrie 
2005 in Sri Lanka; Yi & Davey 2010 in China; Campbell 
& Rahman 2010 in the UK; Wagiciengo & Belal 2012 in 
Africa; Yıldız 2014 in Turkey; De Silva et al. 2014 in New 
Zealand) used corporate annual reports as the study subject. 
In the Malaysian context, similar studies were conducted 
by Haji and Ghazali (2012) and Amin, Saringat, Hassan 
and Ismail (2013). Typically, these studies determined the 
trend of HCD marginally escalated over times. However, 
none of these studies have provided evidence of the real 
factors that contributed to the increment trend. 
 A few specific HCD studies (i.e., means not within 
the IC framework) were also conducted (Huang, Abidin 
& Jusoff 2009; Huang, Tayles & Haniffa 2013; Saad & 
Salleh 2010; Khan & Khan 2010; Moller, Gamerschlag 
& Guenther 2011). Huang et al. (2009) investigated HCD 
in the annual reports of the top 100 Malaysian listed 
companies. This study determined that 42 companies did 
not disclose human capital information, and the remaining 
56 companies merely disclosed between 1 and 5 of the 
20 human capital item categories. The aforementioned 
study concluded that the companies were not transparent 
in externally disclosing human capital information. A 
significant step should be taken to induce the disclosure 
of additional related human capital information to prevent 
Malaysian companies from lagging behind in reporting 
transparency. Saad and Salleh (2010) observed the 
relationship among six determinant factors of HCD, namely, 
firm size, leverage, profitability, age of listing, auditor 
reputation, and staff cost, among Malaysian Exchange of 
Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation (MESDAQ) 
companies in Malaysia. Content analysis was performed on 
77 annual reports of 117 technology-intensive companies. 
Only size and leverage were determined to be positively 
related to human capital reporting. In Europe, Möller et al. 
(2011) investigated the determining effects of HCD in the 
annual reports of the top 130 German listed companies for 
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. These researchers determined 
that the percentage of companies that disclosed human 
capital information in annual reports intensified over the 
periods and accounted for 66% in 2006 to 84% in 2009. 
Large companies provide the most HCD. Large companies 
are considered politically attentive, thereby providing 
extensive disclosure to manage political cost. 
 However, previous studies have clearly privileged 
cross-sectional information with research that focus on 
a magnitude of disclosure. In addition, only the typical 
characteristics of companies, such as size, industry, and 
profit, have been treated as antecedents of the disclosure. 
These factors would not facilitate the understanding of the 
“changeable factors” that could encourage companies to 
report extensive human capital information. The pressure 
of stakeholders is considered a changeable factor that 
could be managed and induced in certain ways. Given the 
assumed incremental pressure of stakeholders’ groups 
over human capital information (Khan & Khan 2010; 
Wagiciengo & Belal 2012), the time was apt to observe the 
manner by which such disclosure could be affected by the 
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presence of stakeholders (i.e., in this case, labor unions and 
governments). Limited information on the pressure from 
stakeholder groups over HCD has driven this research to 
delve into the effect of labor unions and government on 
the reporting of human capital information. The reason is 
that both parties can pressure companies to disclose human 
capital information. Such reaction is expected when labor 
union fights for employee benefits (Brown & Warren 2011) 
and the government prefers social and political goals over 
the maximization of company profit (Mohd Saleh, Rahman 
& Hassan 2009).
UNIONIZATION AND GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP: 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY PERSPECTIVE
To reduce irregularities, organizations have an obligation 
to provide sufficient information on financial and social 
issues that prevail in their milieu. Stakeholder theory 
states that the management of an organization is bound 
to meet the demands of stakeholders and report to them 
the activities of the firm (Friedman & Miles 2006). This 
theory is consistent with Deegan, Rankin, and Tobin 
(2002) and Boesso and Kumar (2007), thereby indicating 
that a stakeholder has the right to be informed about the 
effects of the organization’s activities to them. Hence, 
the information should be made available to them even 
though they may not use it. Similarly, Guthrie, Petty, 
and Ricceri (2006, p. 256) stated that “An organization’s 
management is expected to undertake activities deemed 
important by their stakeholders and to report on those 
activities back to the stakeholders… stakeholder theory 
highlights organizational accountability beyond simple 
economic and financial performance.” In a few occasions, 
companies may use information disclosure as a strategy to 
gain or maintain the support of its powerful stakeholders 
(Deegan & Blomquist 2006). Highly unionized companies 
and government ownership can be the forcing factors 
that may influence management’s disclosure of human 
capital information. Although most prior studies, including 
Bukh, Nielsen, Gormsen, and Mauritsen (2005); Firer and 
Williams (2005); Mohd Saleh et al. (2009); Mubaraq and 
Ahmed Haji (2014); and Pisano, Lepore, and Lamboglia 
(2017), have analyzed the role of ownerships (including 
government ownership) from the perspective of agency 
theory, only a few studies have observed the ownerships 
from the perspective of stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
current study is one of the early studies that analyzed the 
presence of labor union on HCD. Most prior studies related 
to labor unions merely focused on its roles to human 
resource management (HRM) practices and policies (e.g., 
Brown & Warren 2011). However, the role of labor unions 
should not be limited to management practices because 
their effect may result in accounting practices. Therefore, 
the current study extends the politics of government 
ownership and labor unions on HCD.
 Visser (2006) explained that a union is a worker or 
staff association, or a person who pays his or her levy 
and is recognized as a member of a union association. 
Union is an entity that is shaped by workers and ran 
as a democratic state to represent workers in any firm 
or government organization. Moreover, unions aim to 
safeguard the interests of employees and promote mutual 
relationships between an organization and its employees 
(Napathorn & Chanprateep 2011; Wilawan 2007). Labor 
unions have increasingly become a significant player in 
the labor market and political field in most developed 
countries because they possess significant power that 
influences HRM practices toward a collective decision-
making approach (Cristiani & Peiró 2015). The collective 
approach of labor unions influences employers to establish 
fair terms of employment contract, ensure a healthy 
working environment and improved communication, and 
voice mechanisms. However, apart from demanding fair 
salary and welfare, this stakeholder group may influence 
companies to provide HC information to ensure the high 
level of transparency and responsibility of worker states. 
Employee-related information disclosure would clarify a 
company’s responsibility toward an employee. The current 
study suggests that companies operating in industries 
with substantial labor union memberships (i.e., high 
unionization companies) are expected to provide high HCD 
in annual reports. Accordingly, the first hypothesis of this 
study is formulated as follows:
H1: The level of company unionization has a positive 
relationship with HCD.
Government ownership accounts for 49.5% in privatized 
entities in Malaysia (Mohd Ghazali 2010). The literature 
suggests that the government closely monitors and oversees 
the activities of these companies given the importance of 
social objectives, as well as ensures the financial success 
of these companies within the boundary of national, 
political, and social wellness. The employee (or human 
capital), who is a major social element in a profit-making 
entity, should be safeguarded against government interest 
in profit-making companies. The presence of government 
ownership in corporate entities should partially protect 
the interest of employees through HCD. Moreover, HCD 
can be regarded as a navigating tool to trace the extent to 
which the government acts in a socially responsible manner 
toward employees in accordance with the principle of the 
“good government doctrine.” Thus, companies in which 
the government is a shareholder have high investments 
on human capital development, thereby possibly leading 
to considerable HCD. Empirical studies have shown that 
governmental ownership positively relates to voluntary 
disclosures in Malaysia (e.g., Mohd Ghazali 2007; Amran 
& Devi 2008), Singapore (Firer & Williams 2005) and 
Nigeria (Mubaraq & Ahmed Haji 2014). However, prior 
studies also provide contradicting findings. Mohd Saleh 
et al. (2009) indicated that government ownership does 
not have a significant effect on IC performance in MESDAQ 
companies. However, the findings of Mohd Saleh et 
al. (2009) may not reflect the environment within the 
companies listed in the Bursa Malaysia because MESDAQ 
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companies are relatively young (with high growth 
potential) and lack established profit track records (Mohd 
Saleh et al. 2009). Thus, stakeholder theory and the 
preceding discussion indicate that companies in which the 
government is a substantial shareholder would disclose 
substantial human capital information. Hence, the second 
hypothesis of this study is formulated as follows:
H2: Government ownership is positively related with HCD.
METHODOLOGY
ANNUAL REPORTS
This study used annual reports as a source of data to 
analyze HCD. Annual reports were selected because they 
are the most broadly dispersed and frequently produced 
documents to diverse groups of stakeholders (Campbell 
2000). Campbell (2004) stressed that many information in 
annual reports are prepared with a high degree of discretion 
and are editorially controlled by a company’s management. 
Hence, management concerns, interests, attitudes, and 
policies are thought to be well-reflected in annual reports. 
The sections of annual reports, including vision and mission 
statement, letter from the chairman, chief executive review, 
financial overview, corporate government reports, outer 
and inner cover pages, remuneration report, directors’ 
reports and corporate governance report, will be covered 
in this study. However, statutory financial statements are 
excluded from the coverage of the content analysis because 
of the financial nature of the statements.
CONTENT ANALYSIS PROTOCOL OF MEASURING HCD
Disclosure index was extensively used in intellectual 
capital and human capital disclosure studies (e.g., Guthrie 
& Petty 2000; Bozzolan et al. 2003; Dominguez 2011; 
Mubarak & Ahmed Haji 2014). However, the index also 
has a few flaws because the method does not count repeated 
information (see Bettie and Thomson 2007), which could 
reflect the importance attached to the messages being 
conveyed. In addition, disclosure index is a method used 
to measure the reported information against the standard 
(benchmark), which is inappropriate for human capital 
information because no jurisdiction has to be benchmarked 
against. 
 Content analysis is a well-recommended and 
systematic technique that has been extensively used in the 
corporate social, ethical, and environmental reporting fields 
of accounting research, as well as applied in the current 
study. Berelson (1952:18) described content analysis as 
the technique for communication content evaluation. 
Holsti (1969:14) defined content analysis as a technique to 
analyze specified messages. The current study adopted the 
categories of human capital information from a review of 
prior literature. A total of 19 items were used in this study 
(see Appendix B). The categories were selected based on 
the most detailed categories to date in determining human 
capital information. Moreover, the items have achieved 
mainstream acceptance and have been regularly used in 
many previous studies (Abeysekera 2008; Campbell and 
Rahman 2010). 
 The current study employed “themes” (or clauses) as 
unit of analysis. Theme is an assertion about information 
in texts and is not restricted to specific syntactical units, 
such as sentences or paragraphs. Theme is an assertion 
about a single subject in a text that may lie in several 
articulated sentences or paragraphs, depending on the 
beginning and ending of the discussion (Campbell & 
Rahman 2010). In terms of counting, the current study 
used the frequency technique to count information. This 
method counts and codes repeated information and is 
considered a valid method to illustrate the importance 
attached to particular information. Krippendorff (2004) 
explained that information tends to be repeated in the text 
when deemed important to senders and receivers. Hence, 
failure to count and record repeatedly iterated information 
would prevent an analysis of the importance of particular 
information categories to the communication process 
(Beattie & Thomson 2007; Abhayawansa & Abeysekera 
2009). A specific coding scheme was developed during 
the pilot test over 10 annual reports to establish reliability. 
The current authors collaborated to establish clear 
category construction, recording instructions, and rules 
of disambiguation. 
MEASURING THE UNIONIZATION OF COMPANIES
Zunker (2011) formulated and used the measurement 
method. This method was also adopted in the current 
study because of its simplicity and straightforwardness 
in determining the level of unionization in a particular 
industry. Accordingly, this method assumes that the 
industry with numerous union memberships is categorized 
as a highly unionized industry; thus, this industry is deemed 
to have a powerful labor union. In general, the classification 
of industries into highly or poorly unionized is made by 
not comparing the percentages of the union memberships 
of each industry with the average percentage of union 
membership across all industries (see Appendix A). This 
formula is applied over labor union lists in 2013 and 2014 
reported by Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC). 
The formula is divided into three simple steps as follows.
The percentages of union membership over the total 
national membership are calculated for each industry per 
year. For example, the agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
industries in 2013 was 8%. The percentage was derived by 
dividing 73,901, which is the number of memberships in 
the industry in 2013, by 914,677, which is the total national 
membership in 2013. 
 The average percentages of membership per year are 
calculated. The percentages were calculated by dividing 
the total percentage of all industries each year by the total 
number of industries (i.e., 19 industries). The average 
percentages of memberships in 2013 and 2014 are 5.4% 
and 5.3%, respectively. 
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 The average percentage calculated in Step 2 is used as 
the cut-off point to differentiate the type of unionization. 
Industries with union membership of over 5.4% (2013) and 
5.3% (2014) are categorized as highly unionized industries, 
whereas the remaining industries are categorized as poorly 
unionized industries (see details in Appendix A). 
 Appendix A shows the seven industries have 
percentages of membership above the average of 5.4% 
in 2013 (5.3% in 2014), which are categorized as highly 
unionized industries. Meanwhile, 12 industries are 
categorized as poorly unionized industries because of lower 
percentages than the average. The next step is to select one 
industry from highly and poorly unionized industries. The 
selection of industries is a matter of judgment and a valid 
reason must be provided in selecting the industry that 
answers the question of this study.
 Despite having considerably high percentages of 
union memberships, the education, public administration, 
and social security industries were excluded from 
the final sample because they are not listed in Bursa 
Malaysia. Thus, no annual reports are publicly available. 
Furthermore, human health, transportation and agriculture, 
and forestry and fishing were excluded because these 
industry categories were incomparable with the industry 
categories listed in Bursa Malaysia. The remaining 
samples were between the manufacturing and bank and 
financial and insurance industries. The banking, financial, 
and insurance industries were selected because they 
are service-based and substantially depend on human 
capability. Thus, these industries most likely provide 
more human capital information than the manufacturing 
industries do. In addition, the MTUC record shows that the 
union membership from this industry in 2013 and 2014 
was over 45,000 members. The ratio of membership 
numbers (+45,000 members) to number of companies 
(23 companies) in such industry is considered enormous, 
thereby indicating the strength of the labor union within 
the industry. Moreover, several previous studies showed 
that human capital information had high value in the 
annual reports of banks (Branco et al. 2011; Khan & 
Ali 2010). The real estate and property industries were 
selected to represent poorly unionized industry instead 
of other industries because of the low number (i.e., 180) 
of memberships registered in MTUC. In addition, this 
industry is clearly categorized in Bursa Malaysia, thereby 
facilitating the selection of companies. In summary, the 
final samples of the current study comprise 23 companies 
from the banking and financial industry and 25 companies 
from the real-estate and properties industry, for a total of 
48 companies. In this study, scores of 1 and 0 were given 
to highly and poorly unionized industries, respectively. 
 The annual reports for the financial years of 2011, 
2012, 2013, and 2014 for each company were downloaded. 
Table 1 shows the 192 annual reports that were analyzed.
MEASURING GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
Government ownership can play an effective role in 
promoting the extent of human capital information 
disclosure. Consistent with the study of Amran and Devi 
(2008); Said, Zainuddin, and Haron (2009); Zunker 
(2011); and Ahmed Haji and Mohd Ghazali (2013), the 
present study measures government ownership based on 
the percentages of shares owned by the government to the 
total number of shares. Thereafter, government ownership 
was coded as “1” when the government owns 5% or above 
of the shares of the company and “0” otherwise.
CONTROL VARIABLES
Four control variables, namely, size, profit, age, and 
leverage of companies, are associated in the model of this 
study. The majority of previous studies have proven that 
these control variables affected the amount of corporate 
disclosure. This study measured the size of companies by 
market capitalization. The greater the market capitalization, 
the more likely the firm will make HCD in the annual report 
(Amran & Devi 2008). The companies’ ROE (total equity 
to net income) was used to measure profitability. Profitable 
companies will provide substantial voluntary disclosure 
(Ahmed Haji & Mohd Ghazali 2013). 
 In line with Akhtaruddin (2005) and Soliman (2013), 
the current study measured the age of the companies based 
on year of incorporation. Older companies are expected 
to disclose more human capital information than newer 
companies because the former have more resources, 
attained considerable competitive advantages, and 
normally take a lead in better corporate disclosure. Lastly, 
the total debt to total assets was used as a measurement for 
leverage. This variable has been extensively incorporated 
by other studies considering that companies with high 
leverage will provide substantial voluntary disclosure to 
conceal their level of financial obligation (Saad & Salleh 
2010; Zunker 2011).
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the relationship 
among independent variables (i.e., level of companies 
unionization and government ownership), control variables 
TABLE 1. Lists of sample data analyzed 
Industry No. of companies No. of annual reports
Banking and financial
Real estate and properties
23
25
92
100
Total 48 192
118 
(e.g., size, profit, age, and leverage), and dependent 
variables (i.e., human capital information disclosure). The 
assumptions underlying the regression model were tested 
for normal distribution, linearity between independent and 
dependent variables, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, 
and uncorrelated error terms. The regression model based 
on human capital disclosure is depicted as follows:
 HCD = β0 + β1LCU + β2GOV + β3SIZE + 
   β4PROFT + β4AGE + β6LEV + ε,
where:
 HCD =  Human capital disclosure
 LCU =  Level of companies unionization
 GOV =  Government ownership
 SIZE =  Market capitalization
 PROFIT =  Return on equity (ROE)
 AGE =  Age of incorporation
 LEV =  Total debt to total assets
 β
0
 … β
6 
=  Coefficients to be estimated
 ε = Error terms
FINDINGS
Table 2 shows that 3,045 themes related to HCD were 
determined to have been disclosed in 192 annual reports 
(average of 16 themes per annual reports). From a 
longitudinal perspective, the analysis showed that the 
HCD frequency in 2011 was 692 themes, and slightly 
decreased to 662 themes in 2012. However, the total HCD 
frequency increased to 734 themes in 2013. Lastly, the 
HCD frequency reached its zenith of 957 themes in 2014. 
The results indicate that the increasing amount of human 
capital disclosure over the years in annual reports testifies 
to the growing awareness and understanding of companies 
to value their employees through explicit disclosure about 
them.
 Table 2 shows that the average frequency of HCD 
by high level of companies unionization (banking and 
financial sector) were 24.7 themes per annual compared to 
only 7.7 themes per annual report found in annual reports 
of low level of companies unionization (real estate and 
properties industry). The distribution of the HCD frequency 
by government ownership clearly demonstrates a vast 
difference between government- and non- government 
ownership companies. Government ownership companies 
were determined to be substantial disclosers with 31.8 
themes per annual report, which is considerably higher 
than non-government ownership companies with only 11 
themes disclosed per annual report.
 Furthermore, this study reveals the frequency 
distribution by HCD theme categories for all years. In 
general, not all HCD categories received the same weight 
of disclosure importance from companies. For example, 
the information on incentive programs was the most 
popular disclosure, which recorded the highest frequency 
of 273 themes, followed by information relating to career 
development [271 themes] and policy on competent 
training programs [248 themes]. Moreover, the information 
on employee facilities and benefits, as well as employment 
health and safety, are significant with a total score of 233 
themes. Other information that received equal importance 
was that on vocational qualifications [232 themes], 
employee’s share option scheme [223 themes], community 
involvement [213 themes], and the company’s expressions 
of gratitude toward employees [206 themes]. The HCD 
categories that received limited importance in annual 
reports were information on employee’s education and 
loyalty, company’s philosophy about the employee, equity 
issues, training and recruitment programs, and employee 
share scheme, all of which accounted for below 100 themes 
for all years (see Appendix B).
 This study diagnosed VIF and tolerance. The finding 
indicates no case of multicollinearity in the data set. Table 
3 shows the tolerance for industry’s size = 0.392 and VIF 
= 2.548; tolerance for industry’s profits = 0.650 and VIF 
= 1.538; tolerance for industry’s age = 0.884 and VIF = 
1.131; tolerance for industry’s LEV = 0.935 and VIF = 1.070; 
tolerance for degree of unionization (high) = 0.696 and VIF 
= 1.437; and tolerance of government ownership (GOV) = 
0.638 and VIF = 1.569 (see Table 3). Thus, these values are 
below the threshold of the maximum tolerance of 1 and 
VIF of 10. Thus, the researchers concluded that no case of 
collinearity exists in the data. Therefore, the data set has 
met the assumption of multiple linear regression analysis.
 Multiple regression analysis was conducted to test 
the relationship between independent variables and 
HCD in annual report (see Table 4). Both hypotheses 
formulated in this study are supported by the analysis. 
The standardized regression weight shows that the high 
High LCU is a significant predictor of the HCD frequency 
TABLE 2. HCD themes frequency 
n 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Total HCD themes 192 692 662 734 957 3,045
Average HCD themes per annual report in :
 High LCU
 Low LCU
 Government ownership 
 Non-Government ownership
92
100
44
148
5.6
1.7
8.3
2.4
5.3
1.7
7.0
2.4
6.2
1.7
6.8
3.0
7.6
2.7
9.7
3.6
24.7
7.7
31.8
11.0
  119
(β = 0.302, t = 6.443, p<0.05) and government ownership 
companies are also a significant predictor of the HCD 
frequency (β = 0.312, t = 6.359, p<0.05). Moreover, this 
study indicated that a significant relationship between 
company size and the HCD frequency (β = 0.435, t = 6.964, 
p<0.05) is observed. Meanwhile, PROFIT, AGE, and LEV 
are not significant predictors of human capital disclosure.
DISCUSSION
This study presents an initial material on the extent of 
HCD practiced by listed Malaysian companies from two 
industries with high and low labor union associations. 
The analysis illustrates an important change in the 
disclosure frequency within four years is observed, thereby 
emphasizing the increasing understanding and awareness 
of managers to disclose employee-related information. 
The increasing trend of HCD determined in this study is 
corroborated by other Malaysian research findings, such 
as Ahmed Haji and Mohd Ghazali (2012) and Rashid, 
Ibrahim, Othman and See (2012). The transition from 
a traditional to a knowledge economy experienced 
by Malaysian companies witnessed the changes from 
the traditional commodities and manufacturing-based 
industries to those that are service based. The shift of 
economic base has been an impetus that fostered gradual 
change in the reporting behavior of companies to cope 
with the changes in corporate strategies and value creation. 
Accordingly, companies used HCD as an effective strategy 
of corporate disclosure to signal to stakeholders their 
responses, responsibilities, and values toward their human 
capital. In such a case, as suggested by stakeholder theory 
(Abeysekera 2006), the disclosure strategy may seem 
less effective through the traditional symbol of corporate 
success (e.g., through mandatory disclosure of financial 
and hard assets) (Guthrie & Ricceri 2004; Whiting & 
Miller 2008).
 In terms of the HCD elements, the companies placed 
different weights of importance among the elements, 
that is, the importance of information varies across 
elements. The results illustrate that the information on 
incentive programs has received considerable attention by 
reporting companies, followed by information on career 
development, and policy on competent training programs. 
These types of information may be regarded as strategic 
information by companies to attract the best potential 
employee and to motivate and retain existing employees. 
Other information, such as that on gender, ethnic and 
religious issues, and education, was less common for 
Malaysian companies possibly due to the sensitivity of 
the topics.
 In line with the first hypothesis, the result determined 
a positive and significant relationship between the high 
LCU and HCD. The result is consistent with the current 
understanding that banking and financial institution 
companies are highly unionized. Thus, the strong force of 
their labor unions may influence the companies to disclose 
substantial human capital information. A total of 45,113 
banking employees were members of the labor union in 
2014 (45,013 members in 2013) reflect the significant power 
of the labor union which can exercise its clout over the 
bank. Operating within the highly unionized environment, 
the banking and financial institution sector in Malaysia may 
be considerably responsive and sensitive to their respective 
TABLE 3. Multicollinearity Test Tolerance and VIF 
Variables Tolerance VIF
LCU
GOV
SIZE
PROFIT
AGE
LEV
0.696
0.638
0.392
0.650
0.884
0.935
1.437
1.569
2.548
1.538
1.131
1.070
TABLE 4. Multiple Linear Regression on HC Disclosure 
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta (β) t Sig.
(Constant)
LCU
GOV
SIZE
PROFIT
AGE
LEV
-34.937
8.404
10.301
6.902
-0.594
2.728
0.018
5.148
1.304
1.620
0.991
1.506
2.192
0.031
0.302
0.312
0.435
-0.019
0.052
0.024
-6.786
6.443
6.359
6.964
-0.395
1.244
0.590
0.000
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.694
0.215
0.556
Note: R2 =0.717, adjusted R2 = 0.707 
Note: *significant at p<0.05
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labor unions. Thus, they are likely to disclose substantial 
information related to their employees to gain acceptance 
from their labor unions. These findings are congruent with 
stakeholder theory, which suggests that the disclosure 
of human capital information would make companies 
meet their stakeholders’ needs and further improve their 
reputation for transparency, credibility and good company–
stakeholder relationship (Abeysekera 2006).
 Furthermore, reporting on human capital information 
is important in service industries, such as banking, because 
humans are considered core assets in consulting and 
serving customers on finance-related matters. Accordingly, 
disclosing additional information on human capital may be 
part of a strategy to attract potential employees or signal 
that existing employees are being acknowledged as assets in 
the companies and unveil their highly capable staff before 
investing in these companies (Abeysekera 2008). The 
findings of the current study also corroborate the findings 
of Khan and Ali (2010), who determined a predominance 
of HCD in Bangladeshi banking companies. Similarly, 
Branco, Delgado, Sausa, and Sa (2011) discovered a high 
proportion of HCD in the banking industry in the annual 
and website reports.
 The second hypothesis is also supported in this study. 
The present study provides evidence that government 
ownership is significantly associated with HCD based on 
the annual reports of Malaysian companies. The findings 
of this study are consistent with those of previous studies, 
which demonstrated that GLCs provide substantial voluntary 
disclosure in their annual reports compared with non-GLC 
companies (Mohd Ghazali 2007; Amran & Devi 2008; Yau & 
Balaraman 2009). Therefore, the presence of the government 
through share ownership inducts the government’s social 
objectives into the company’s report to protect the well-
being of employees. The social objectives of the government 
can be partially supported by the presence of human capital 
information reported by companies. Companies use HCD 
to signal that the government (being a strong stakeholder) 
operates in line with government objectives to uphold and 
maintain social order. The government also uses human 
capital information disclosure to convey an image of good 
governance to the public.
 In terms of control variables, only the size of 
companies shows a significant positive relationship with 
HCD. This finding corroborated those of the prior studies, 
which indicate that the size and the extent of ICD are 
associated (Amran & Devi 2008; Kent & Chan 2009; 
Rahim, Atan & Kamaludin 2011). The result clarifies 
that large companies are more sensitive and exposed 
to political cost than smaller companies. Therefore, 
conveying considerable human capital information to 
strong stakeholders would reduce the cost. Lastly, the large 
volumes of information disclosed on various human capital 
elements in the annual reports of banking and government-
owned companies provide support to stakeholder theory. 
These companies consistently recognize the importance 
of stakeholders in their business activities. Recognition 
can be described through the increasingly large volumes 
of HCD. The disclosure enhanced the image of companies 
likely improved relationships with these stakeholders. With 
regard to the positive branch of stakeholder theory, the 
findings of this study suggest that the more the influence the 
stakeholder have in the companies, the more information 
about the stakeholders is disclosed in the annual reports. 
This assumption is commensurate with basic semiotic 
assumption in content analysis. In this study, the disclosure 
volume indicates that labor unions and government are the 
most powerful stakeholders that affect disclosure.
CONCLUSION
This study aims to provide a preliminary perspective 
regarding the relationship among unionized industry, 
government ownership, and HCD based on stakeholder 
theory. A rigorous content analysis was conducted over 
the annual reports of companies to capture HCD and 
determined that the frequency of HCD in annual reports is 
significantly related with level of companies unionization 
and government ownership. That is, highly unionized 
companies, such as banking and financial companies, 
disclose substantial human capital information and can be 
partially explained by the necessity of the companies to 
obtain approval from labor unions through HCD. Moreover, 
government-owned companies practice similar disclosure 
strategies to be seen as “good government” from the 
employee’s perspective. The current study also determined 
an increment amount of HCD over four years, thereby 
emphasizing the growing awareness and understanding 
of companies to value their employees through explicit 
disclosure on human capital. The findings add new 
relevance to stakeholder theory in understanding the role 
of labor union on corporate reporting behavior. This study 
implies that labor union is not a weak stakeholder; instead, 
it can play a significant role to enforce the company to 
convey substantial employee-related information. HCD can 
also provide an incentive for all companies to cast focus on 
HCD because disclosure would likely foster a harmonious 
relationship with employees, unions, and government. 
 Several limitations and prospective research are 
identified in this study, which only interrogated annual 
reports. Companies may use another media to report 
human capital information, such as websites (Striukova, 
Unerman & Guthrie 2008). Thus, future research could 
solve this limitation by expanding the research focus on 
other media of reporting. The sample was limited to two 
types of industries, namely, banking and financial service 
and real estate and properties. Accordingly, associating 
sample from other industries would provide considerable 
generalization to the research findings. Although this 
study focuses on the Malaysian context, other countries 
with shifting legal, society, culture, and politics could 
provide HCD in different manners. Therefore, conducting 
a similar study in other countries is attractive. Future 
research could be consistent with quantitative research 
by conducting interviewing and survey to understand the 
actual motivation behind the development of HCD. 
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APPENDIX A
Industries
% Union 
Membership
Over total 
membership
Level of 
unionization
2013 2014 2013 2014
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply 
Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities
Construction
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
Transportation and Storage
Accommodation and Food Service Activities
Information and Communication
Banking, financial and Insurance
Real Estate (real properties)
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities
Administrative and Support Service Activities
Public Administration and Social Security
Education
Human Health and Social Work Activities
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation
Other Service Activities
8
0
10.4
5
0
0
5
6
2
2
7
0
0
0
13.5
36
7
0
0
8.5
0
10.4
5
0
0
5
6
1
2
7
0
0
0
13.5
36
7
0
0
High
Poor
High
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
High
Poor
Poor
High
Poor
Poor
Poor
High
High
High
Poor
Poor
High
Poor
High
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
High
Poor
Poor
High
Poor
Poor
Poor
High
High
High
Poor
Poor
Average percentages of membership 5.4 5.3
APPENDIX B
 
Distribution of HCD categories, all years
No HC Elements Frequency(themes) Percentage
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Incentive Programs
Career Development
Policy on Competent Training program 
Employee facilities and benefits provided
Employment health and safety
Vocational Qualifications 
Employee share option scheme 
Employee involvement in the community
Employee thanked
Entrepreneurial spirit and innovativeness
Employee featured
Employee compensation plan 
Employee share scheme 
Training and recruitment programs 
Equity issues: race, gender, and religion
Executive compensation plan 
Company philosophy about employee 
Employee loyalty/ Employee turnover
Education 
273
271
248
233
233
232
223
213
206
184
154
95
81
79
79
69
62
56
54
9.00
8.90
8.15
7.65
7.65
7.62
7.33
7.00
6.77
6.04
6.06
3.12
2.66
2.60
2.60
2.27
2.04
1.84
1.78
TOTAL 3,045 100

